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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of violent crime on the prevalence of early motherhood in Colombia. To 
instrument for the predominance of violent crime I use geographical and temporal variation in drug 
trafficking networks. My results suggest that one standard deviation increase in the homicide rate 
induces a 2.55 percentage points increase in the probability of early motherhood. 
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to understand the behavioural rationale underlying differential teen pregnancy profiles in conflict areas.
Indeed, I find that increases in municipality homicide rate increase the probability that a woman will be pregnant before she
is 19 years old in Colombia.1
There is extensive literature that analyses the causes of early childbearing and the cost to parents and children. It has
been shown that young mothers face reductions in the accumulation of human capital, labor opportunities, income and their
own health. (Klepinger et al. (1999), Buckles (2008) and Fletcher (2011)). Furthermore, the outcomes in education, health
and labor opportunities for the offspring of young mothers decrease significantly (Klepinger et al. (1999), Buckles (2008),
Francesconi (2008) and Miller (2009, 2011)).
Despite the drop of 17% in the worldwide Teenage Fertility Rate (TFR2) from 2002 to 2011, the issue of early motherhood
continues to be of public concern worldwide.3 For example, the average TFR in low income countries fell 34% between 2002
and 2011.4 Nevertheless, the average TFR in low income countries is 1.7 times the world average and 3.5 times the average
in OECD countries. What is more, against the worldwide decreasing tendency, countries like Spain and the United Kingdom
showed increases of 18% and 4% in the TFR from 2002 to 2011. The TFR increased in Spain from 9.4 to 11.1 and from 28.6
to 29.7 in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2011.
Flo´rez and Soto (2007) describe the evolution of the fertility behaviour in Colombia. The authors argue that the increasing
trend of the TFR in Colombia was not expected. According to the World Bank while the TFR in Latin America and the
Caribbean dropped from 85.85 in 1997 to 81.57 in 2002, the rate in Colombia increased from 91.7 to 95.7. Flo´rez and
Soto pointed out that TFR continued increasing despite the improvements in education, health services and urbanization.
Therefore, this paper claims that part of rise in teenage births was due to the violence of the armed conflict in the country.
Concurrently, there is an increasing interest to understand the driving forces and mechanisms by which war, crime and armed
conflict affect economic institutions. However, analyses of internal conflicts usually face large heterogeneity of the causes,
participants, characteristics and consequences of the violent process. More analytical challenges arise due to the multiple
dimension is such violence and conflict affect economic agents and institutions.
Soares (2013) reviews the different welfare implications of armed conflict and criminal violence. The author categorises the
possible consequences as follows: firstly, there are direct losses as lifespan reductions and behavioural changes due to greater
insecurity. Secondly, there is a social cost in the destruction of goods, public and private investment in security and the
cost justice and imprisonment. Finally, crime can be the cause of reductions in productivity or a decrease in investment
as a response to shorter lifespans. Each conflict scenario implies different challenges when researches want to identify the
economic effects of violence. Mainly, when researches look for exogenous violent shocks.
Hence, this paper contributes to both, the growing literature to identify the indirect consequences of violent crime, and the
understanding of the causes of early motherhood in developing countries.
The core argument of this work is that when a household is exposed to an increase in local violence, the cost-benefit
relationship of postponing motherhood changes. In fact, the incentive to be a young mother increases. Firstly, armed
violence reduces the incentive to invest in education, reduces the expected prize of postponing motherhood. Secondly, since
violence affects men more than women changes in the sex ratios reduce the expected gains in the marriage markets.
Works such as Abramitzky et al. (2010) and Shemyakina (2009) have found interesting relationships between violence of the
civil war and marriage markets and fertility decisions. These authors take advantage of sharp, localised increases in violence
to identify the effects of conflict over households. However, such sharp changes are not present in the Colombian case when
the conflict is long-lasting and volatile.
Thus, first I set up a theoretical framework that follows closely Kearney and Levine (2011) in order to describe the possible
channels such violence could affect the cost-benefit relation of postponing motherhood. In order to test the model, I estimate
a effect of the homicide rate at the municipality level on the hazard of being pregnant when a woman is younger than 19
years old. To instrument for the prevalence of local homicides, I use the interaction of the international cocaine prices and
the potential cocaine trafficking network in Colombia. Identification relies on the fact that different regions in Colombia
serve different international cocaine markets. Thus, when the price of cocaine rises in the United States (Europe), violence
between drug traffickers, who compete for regional control, rises in the municipalities strategically placed to serve the
American (European) market.
After accounting for endogeneity, I find that one standard deviation increase in the municipality homicide rate increases
the probability of a woman to become pregnant for the first time before 19 years old by 2.55 percentage points with a 95%
confidence interval from 0.70 to 4.39 . What is more, an increase in violent kills increases the probability of early marriage
but reduces the probability of early sexual intercourse and having a second baby before 19 years old. The latest results
suggest that early pregnancy and marriage is being use by teenage women as an insurance strategy when women foresee a
reduction in the future utility due to an increase in local violence.
1The homicide rate is equal to the number of intentional homicides per 100 thousand habitants.
2The TFR is defined as the number births from every 1000 women from 15 - 19 years old.
3The World TFR dropped from 64.71 to 52.67. Data from The World Bank
4Low income countries according to the World Bank classification.
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This paper has the following structure. After this introduction, section 2 explains the mechanisms by which exposure to
armed violence changes the cost-benefit relationship of postponing motherhood. Section 3 builds from the results for the
previous section and motivates an empirical strategy to estimate the e↵ect of municipality violence on the probability of
becoming a young mother. What is more, in this section I discuss the endogeneity issues and identification. Section 4
describes the data and section 5 shows and discussed the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A model of pregnancy and armed violence
In this section I develop a model of women’s fertility choices that help to understand the way in which the local violence,
specifically homicides, a↵ect the probability of becoming a young mother. I build on the work of Kearney and Levine (2011),
where the decision of postponing motherhood is driven by the subjective probability of economic success. I complement their
model making explicit the role of the marriage market.
This framework focuses only on the decision of the time of first pregnancy. Thus, I do not analyse decisions such as marriage,
divorce or family size. However, I show later in this paper the importance of early marriage in this framework. In addition,
this model only takes into account women’s decisions and ignores male actions and matching equilibrium. The final restriction
is due to the lack of data on male behaviour.
2.1 Model set up
Assume that a woman i with characteristics µi lives over 2 periods t = {0, 1}, which represent teenage and adulthood years
respectively. µi represents the woman’s characteristics that are valuable by man such as education, income, race and physical
features. Women gain utility from consumption and motherhood.
On the one hand, if a woman has no children each period receives one random o↵er (couple) x from the set of available men
⌦it ⇢ R+. Once she receives an o↵er she decides either to have a baby with x or not. Denote Git (x) as the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of o↵ers x and git (x) is the corresponding probability density function (pdf). At the beginning
of period t = 0 no woman has a baby and they all receive o↵ers from their respective ⌦it.
When a woman accepts an o↵er x she gains utility vi (x) = ↵i   + di (x) for one period, where ↵i   0 is the direct utility
of being a mother, baby care has a fixed cost of    0 and di (x) is the utility from the match surplus. For simplicity,
di (x) = bi (x  µi) with bi > 0. Therefore, higher o↵ers, better partners, will give a higher level of motherhood utility. It is
important to point out that a woman accepts an o↵er x only if vi (x)   0. For o↵ers such that vi (x) < 0, a woman prefers
to stay single and childless.5 Finally, the mother will gain utility  i (x) when her o↵spring has grown up. I assume that
@ i/@x   0. Given that the model only has 2 periods women will not gain  i (x) if they decide to postpone motherhood to
period 1.
On the other hand, u (ct) represents the utility from consumption, where u (·) is an increasing and concave function. At t = 0
women consume c0 with probability 1. At t = 1 women can have either high or low consumption. Declare, c1 = {c¯1, c1}
where P (c1 = c¯1) = q and c¯1 > c1. Following Kearney and Levine (2011), q   i is the subjective probability of achieving
high consumption (c¯1), in other words, the subjective probability of achieving economic success. The probability qi depends
on each woman decision at t = 0. If she decides to become a young mother, her subjective probability of success is qei .
Meanwhile, qdi is her probability of getting high consumption if she decides to delay motherhood until t = 1. As assumed in
Kearney and Levine (2011), this paper assumes that for every woman i, qe < qd.
As follows, with discount factor  , woman’s i lifetime expected utility of becoming a mother at t = 0 for a given couple x is:
Uei (x) = U
e
i0 (x) +  V
e
i (x) (1)
Uei0 (x) = u (c0) + vi (x) is the immediate utility in t = 0. Meanwhile V
e
i (x) = q
e
i u (c¯1) + (1  qe)u (c1) +  i (x) is her
expected utility in t = 1. Given that she is already a mother, there is only uncertainty in consumption at period 1.
If she decides to postpone motherhood, her lifetime expected utility is:
Udi = U
d
0 +  V
d
i (2)
Where Ud0 = u (c0) is her immediate utility in t = 0. Her expected utility in t = 1 is V
d
i = q
d
i u (c¯1) +
 
1  qdi
 
u (c1) +
(1 Gi1 (xi)) vi (xˆi). Gi1 (xi) is the probability of receiving an o↵er lower than xi, which is the minimum o↵er that a
woman would accept in t = 1. xi is the couple such that vi (xi) = 0. Finally, xˆi =
R
xi
zgi1 (z) dz is the expected value of
an acceptable o↵er she could receive in t = 1. In this case, woman i is uncertain about her future consumption and her
motherhood outcomes.
5In fact, given that di (x) depends negatively on µi, under di↵erent search technologies the equilibrium could lead to an assortative matching.
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2.2 The optimal pregnancy decision
Declare  qi c =
 
qdi   qei
 
(c¯1   c1). Then, for a given o↵er x, a woman i chooses to be a mother at t = 0 if:
(vi (x) +   i (x))    (1 Gi1 (xi)) vi (xˆi)     qi c (3)
Equation 3 shows the cost-benefit relationship of becoming a young mother. On the left hand side I describe the benefits of
early motherhood. Benefits come from the di↵erence between the certain motherhood utility from a child with the couple x,
and the expected motherhood utility that she could achieve from an unknown couple in period 1. Importantly, if a woman
decide to postpone motherhood she will never be a mother with probability Gi (xi).
The right hand side,  qi c, is the gain in subjective consumption due to postponing motherhood. It represents the
opportunity cost of early childbearing. As shown in previous literature, teenage childbearing is associated with losses in
human capital accumulation which leads to lower levels of consumption over the lifetime (Kearney and Levine (2012)). Thus,
if a woman believes that the expected gains of motherhood are larger than the subjective loss in consumption she will prefer
to become young mother rather than wait until adulthood.
In order to explain the e↵ect of violence on women’s pregnancy decisions I define the turning o↵er x˜i as the couple such that
Ui (x˜i)
e = Udi .
Proposition 1. If Gi1 (x) has full support and bix+ i (x) is invertible, exist an o↵er x˜i such that:
(vi (x˜i) +   i (x˜i))    (1 Gi1 (xi)) vi (xˆi) =   qi c (4)
Therefore, a woman i chooses to have a baby in period t = 0 for every o↵er x > x˜i.
For example, if  i (x) =  x where    0, then:
x˜i =
  ((1 Gi1 (xi)) vi (xˆi) + qi c)  (↵i   ) + biµi
bi +   i
(5)
The first part of equation 5, (1 Gi1 (xi)) vi (xˆi) is the expected value of the expected couple she could get in period 1,
in other words, the first part represents the auction value of delaying pregnancy. The second part of the equation  qi c
represents the opportunity cost of not waiting due to the expected forgone consumption in the future. Thereafter, (↵i   )
represents the possible forgone utility if the woman never married. Finally, biµi represents the direct e↵ect of the woman i
characteristics on the selection of x˜i. These results are according to the findings of Blackburn et al. (1993) and Ermisch and
Pevalin (2004).
Thus, if Gi0 rules the distribution of x when the woman i is a teenager, the probability that she chooses early motherhood
is:
Pi (young mother=1) = Pi (x > x˜) = 1 Gi0 (x˜i) (6)
2.3 How does armed violence a↵ect women’s decision?
Equation 6 helps to understand the possible mechanisms through which armed violence a↵ects the probability of becoming
a young mother. It is important to point out that this paper does not analyse the impact of gender and sexual violence in
conflict.6 As explained in the introduction, the analysis focuses on understanding the e↵ect of homicides on the pregnancy
decisions.
Declare #i as the level of armed violence a woman i is exposed to in period 0. Then, rewriting equation 6 as hi =
P (young mother =1 | x˜i) = 1   Gi0 (x˜i). Therefore, the influence of violence in the decision of woman i can be written as
@hi/@#i =  gi0 (x˜i) @x˜i/@#i . Given that gi0 (x˜i) > 0, the analysis simplifies to understand the behaviour of @x˜i/@#i . Therefore,
in this section I discuss how violence a↵ects the di↵erent elements that influence x˜i following equations 4 and 5.
As I claim in the introduction of this paper, violent crime a↵ects the expectations of young women regarding their future
outcomes in the marriage and labor markets. I asses the e↵ect on the marriage market specially through changes in the sex
ratio (SR = men/women), via recruitment of soldiers and killings.
6Previous works such as Lara (2008) and Pinzo´n-Paz (2009) have studied the use and the consequences of gender violence in the Colombian
conflict.One can argue that an increase in homicides is correlated with greater prevalence of sexual and gender violence. I did not find evidence
of this correlation. The main reason may be the quality of the data on sexual and gender violence, and the high levels of unreported events.
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Homicides are more prevalent in men than women. According to official reports 92% of the total homicides are men, while
only 8% of casualties were women.7 Figure 1, shows the variability in the change in the sex ratios in Colombia as a result
of the homicides in each municipality. It is important to point out that no municipality shows a positive change in the sex
ratio. The changes in the ratio are within a range from 0 to -16.6%, showing large heterogeneity in the effect over different
regions of the country.
Figure 1: Estimated change in the adult sex ratio due to homicides from 1990 to 2009
In addition, according to a survey of former soldiers from illegal armed groups in Colombia (DNP (2008)), 91% of the ex
combatants are men. Almost 70% of these men have only primary education or less. Pinto et al. (2002) show that 82% of
the former members of the illegal armed groups joined the group when they were 10 to 17 years old.
Therefore, I contend that decreases in sex ratio affect the decision of motherhood in the following ways. Firstly, when the
sex ratio falls (less men) the probability of finding a couple in both periods decrease. On the one hand, if Gi0 moves to the
left the probability that a woman receives an offer better than x˜i reduces. Following Shemyakina (2009), when the shock
on male deaths is substantial, women may postpone marriage and motherhood due to the decreased availability of men in
the area. On the other hand, if Gi1 moves to the left the effect is twofold. Initially, the woman i expectation of receiving
an acceptable couple reduces. Furthermore, if given that xˆ is a function of gi1 (x), the value of xˆ reduces as well. Therefore,
the auction value of postponing motherhood decreases.
In addition, the fall in the sex ratio may have other consequences that are not directly associated with x˜i as defined in
equation 5. For example, when the sex ratio decreases, each woman has less bargaining power and the expected quality of
the offer decreases (men could choose better partners). Therefore, the value of the expected couple xˆ will reduce as well.
This result follows Abramitzky et al. (2010) and Chiappori et al. (2002). Furthermore, one can claim that losing bargaining
power reduces women’s autonomy over their own fertility choices. Therefore, if men in conflict aim to have a child in order
to build a memory or legacy after death, then they will push women to become mothers when young.
The second mechanism propose in this paper is the effect that violent crime can have on the expectations of future economic
success.8 Soares (2005, 2013) and Lorentzen et al. (2008) argue that armed conflict increases future uncertainty, and thereby
reduces investment in activities like education. One can also argue that the feeling of despair, as opposed to hope, increases
when violence increases around a household. What is more, Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2009) show that high school drop
out rates increase when violence increase in Colombia. In addition, Moya and Carter (2014) find that armed conflict and
traumatic experiences are linked lower expectations on upward social mobility. Therefore, I could expect that ∂ΔqiΔc/∂ϑi < 0
Table 1 shows that violence also affects parental expectations about the benefits of education. Using data from the evaluation
of the social welfare programme Red Juntos.9 The table shows that in municipalities where the mean and the standard
deviation of the homicide rate is higher, parents have lower expectations about the income of their offspring if she or he
finishes university education. However, the effect is not significant when the expectations are conditional to finishing only
high school. If parental expectations are lower, one can expect that teenagers living in violent environments do not recognise
an expected return from an investment in education, especially post-secondary. Therefore, the expected opportunity cost of
being young parents is reduced.
Consequently, an increase in armed violence raises the value of the expected gains in the marriage market (left hand side
of equation 3). Meanwhile, it reduces the expected premium of postponing motherhood (right hand side of equation 3).
Therefore, ∂hi/∂ϑi > 0.
However, there may be ways in which violence decreases the teenage pregnancy rate, thus, the final effect can be ambiguous.
As I already mention, Gi0 can move to the left so less women may get acceptable offers at t = 0, which means that the
pregnancy rate falls. What is more, following Acemoglu et al. (2004) male movement to war could have a positive effect on
7I will describe this statistics in more detail in section 4
8Likewise Kearney and Levine (2011) and their idea of despair.
9More information about the programme is available in the following link - http://web.presidencia.gov.co/especial/juntos/index.html
5
Table 1:
OLS estimations of the e↵ect of homicides on parental expectations about o↵spring’s future income, conditional on being working and achieving
a maximum level of education
Moment of the homicide rate
(1990 - 2009)
If the o↵spring finishes
High school University
Standard deviation -0.047 -0.370***
(0.078) (0.108)
Mean -0.031 -0.246***
(0.052) (0.072)
N 1258 1055
Notes: Based on the data from the welfare programme Juntos in 2011. The sample includes 77 municipalities. Standard errors clustered by
municipality in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
the female labor market, thereby increasing the premium of postponing motherhood. Their analysis is based on the situation
of a massive armed confrontation such as the World War II. However, Singh and Shemyakina (2013) have shown the opposite
e↵ect during the Punjab insurgency, which is a case more similar to the Colombian case.
I cannot rule out these last two options which imply a reduction in the probability of being a young mother by an increase
in the level of violence.
Unfortunately, the data available for this paper does not allow me to disentangle each channel. I do not have individual
information about women’s expectations in the labor and marriage markets. Nevertheless, my results support the notion
that the negative e↵ects on the labor and marriage market overcome the opposite e↵ects. In summary, an increase in violence
reduces the expected revenues of young women in the labor and marriage market. Teenage pregnancy therefore works as
insurance when a loss in future utility is foreseen by young women.
From the discussion in this section I can set some testable implications. First, increases in armed violence should a↵ect
the timing of first pregnancy of young women more than older women. I could expect that when women finish education
there is no further cost in the labor market. Violence may only a↵ect women’s decision through its e↵ect on the marriage
market. Second, having the first baby already guarantees utility for motherhood and implies a cost in the labor market. A
second baby may imply more utility from motherhood but at no extra cost in the labor market. Therefore, the e↵ect of
more violence on second pregnancies may be zero or negative. Finally, given that early motherhood in the model works as
insurance when there is a negative shock in the expectations in the marriage and labor market; the e↵ect of armed violence
may be similar on early marriage. In this case I do not expect a strong e↵ect on out of the wedlock childbearing.
3 Estimation strategy
In this section I describe the estimation methods used to assess the e↵ect of armed violence on the prevalence of teen
motherhood in Colombia. Previously I discussed how di↵erent types of armed violence could a↵ect the probability of being
a young mother, however, this paper focuses only on the e↵ect of homicides on teenage pregnancy. To estimate this e↵ect I
rewrite equation 6 as Pimt (Young mother = 1) = 1 G (x˜ (hommt, Ximt)) = h (hommt, Ximt), where hommt is the homicide
rate in municipality m at period t.
Following Lancaster (1979) and Jenkins (2005), I estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model, where hijmt represents
the probability that woman i will become pregnant at age j, given she was not pregnant before age j, and that she is living
in municipality m at period t.10 hijmt can be written as a function of the unconditional hazard rate h0 (j) and a linear index
on Xi, hommt and "ijmt.
hijmt = h0 (j) g ( Xi +  hommt + "ijmt) (7)
According to the model developed in section 2, I expect that @h/@hom = h0 (j)  g0 > 0. Therefore, assuming that violence
shocks are exogenous, and hommt and g (hommt) are bounded, it is possible to identify  ˆ and the underline hazard function
h0 (j) using standard regression methods (Van den Berg (2001)).
Subsequently, figure 2, will su ce to demonstrate that armed violence, measure by homicide intensity, has a direct impact
on the probability of becoming a mother when young. Figure 2 shows how the hazard of becoming pregnant for the first time
at age j is always greater for women who live in towns where the homicide rate is larger than 100. The largest di↵erence
occurs when women are 19 years old.
The orthogonality condition may not be credible when the variable of analysis is the violence that a household is exposed to
at certain period of time. In the sense of duration models, endogeneity refers to unobservable variables that a↵ect the level
of exposure to armed violence, and the underlying hazard function of first pregnancy (Bijwaard (2008)). In other words,
10More precisely, in discrete time hij = P (j   1 < T  j | T > j   1). Given that the dependent variable will group all the observations in a
yearly interval I use a discrete duration model. See further discussions in Jenkins (2005) chapter 3.
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Figure 2: First pregnancy discrete hazard function by homicide rate category - h0 (age = j|homicide rate)
there is an unobservable that could make some women more likely to be affected by the local violence. Simultaneously, this
affects their probability of becoming pregnant at a certain age. Then, if hommt ⊥ εijmt I could expect that hommt ⊥ h0 (j),
thus I cannot identify γ using a proportional hazard model.
In Colombia, the differential effect of long lasting violence could be correlated with different institutions, the low presence
of the state and risk aversion profiles of the community. The latest list of variables can also explain the differences in the
fertility profiles between different regions. For this reason, this work proposes an instrumental variable strategy.
3.1 Instrumenting the homicide rate using the internal cocaine trafficking network
To estimate exogenous variation in the homicide rate at municipality level, I use the variation in international cocaine prices
and its interaction with the potential cocaine trafficking network. The internal cocaine trafficking network links municipalities
where coca bushes are cropped to municipalities on the Colombian border using the road’s network. Therefore, the network
includes every single municipality that could be used by Colombian drug dealers to transport cocaine from the crops to the
ports.11
The strategy uses time variation from changes in yearly cocaine prices in the United States (US) and Europe. To get regional
variation I exploit the fact that different regions in Colombia have comparative advantage to serve different international
markets. Consequently, the effect of changes in each international price is heterogeneous across Colombian municipalities.
The World Drug Report in 2011 (UNODC (2000-2012)) discusses the main international cocaine trafficking routes from
South American Andean countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia). Accordingly, cocaine sold in the American market leaves
Colombia from the Pacific coast to reach the south of Mexico and then the southern border of the US. The second route
leaves Colombia from the Atlantic border to reach either Mexico or the South of Florida by ships over the Caribbean Sea. To
reach Europe, cocaine exits Colombia either from the Atlantic border or from the border with Venezuela. On the one hand,
when cocaine is shipped from the Atlantic, it travels through the Atlantic Ocean to reach the border of Portugal or Spain.
On the other hand, when cocaine leaves from the border with Venezuela it travels to the plains of the south of Venezuela to
reach the Atlantic Ocean, where it then reaches West Africa and is shipped to the South of Europe.
In that sense, one can expect that when the price of cocaine increases in the US violence in Colombian municipalities
connected with the traffic going to the Pacific or Atlantic will rises. When the cocaine price increases in Europe competition
in the municipalities linked with the Atlantic coast or the Venezuelan border is harder and the violence between drug dealers
will rise. Therefore, changes in prices allow me to estimate changes in violence over the time while different parts of the
cocaine trafficking allow to capture regional differential shock when the cocaine prices change in US and Europe.
Identification relies on the following features of the cocaine market: First, drug dealers compete in local oligopoly markets.
According to Echandia (2013) after the killing or incarceration of the drug lords in the early 1990’s the Colombian market
divided in small regional markets where smaller drug dealers compete now for regional control.
Second, in illegal markets firms (gangs) compete using violence rather than prices or quantities. Kugler et al. (2005) and
Fiorentini (1995) also showed that when the expected profits increase competition is harder and violence increases. When
the expected profit rises incumbent firms may use violence to deter entry of new competitors (who may use violence as a
way to enter in the market), or firms may increase violence in order to gain a larger portion of the total profits.
Third, to avoid inverse causality, Colombian drug dealers should not be able to set prices in the consumption regions.
The fact that Colombian drug dealers face internal regional competition reduces their power in the international market.
Furthermore, final prices in Europe and US also include as well the costs and mark ups of each intermediary. By 2008,the
profit of Colombian traffickers constituted about a tenth of the gross profits made by traffickers in American.12 This evidence
11Details of the network are in Milla´n-Quijano (2015)
12According to the World Drug Report in 2010, in 2008 the gross profits of Colombian traffickers who sold cocaine in Mexico were around 2.4
billion dollars. The Mexican groups’ profits were about 2.9 billion and the gross profit of American drug traffickers were about 24 billion dollars
- UNODC (2000-2012)
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shows the market power that American drug dealers exert over Colombian drug dealers. This is also evidence of the limited
power of individual Colombian gangs to a↵ect the final price of cocaine.
Nevertheless, by 2001 Colombia supplied 80% of total cocaine on the world, thus I need to control for national supply shocks
that a↵ect the international price. To do so I control for the price of cocaine in the cities of Colombia. This price represents
the reservation price for internal tra ckers and it will response as well to changes in the supply. Once I control for the price
of cocaine in Colombia the variation in international prices will only be driven by demand shocks.
Fourth, drug tra cking only a↵ect households decision through the violence drug dealers exert of certain municipalities.
Given that I include all the transit points it is likely that tra ckers do not live in the towns they cross. Moreover, Milla´n-
Quijano (2015) shows that tra cking does not explain changes in local taxation. Therefore, changes in the cocaine price are
not changing consumption patterns in the tra cking municipalities.
Consequently, I define P◆t as the wholesale price of cocaine at market ◆ = {United States, Europe} at year t. To control for
common supply shock that may a↵ect the international prices of cocaine, I subtract the price of cocaine in the Colombian
cities to each international price. Dmf = 1 [m 2 f ], is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the municipality m belongs to the
tra cking cluster f . The cocaine tra cking network is divided in four cocaine tra cking clusters according to the frontier
each cocaine tra cking route finishes on: f = {Pacific, Atlantic, Venezuela North, Venezuela South}. Then, a municipality
m 2 f if it is crossed by a route that finishes at frontier f .
In order to capture the e↵ect of cocaine tra cking on violence at the municipality level, I define DDmt as the influence of
the potential drug tra cking over municipality m in year t. Then:
DDmt =
X
◆
X
f
↵◆fP◆Dmf (8)
Then I expect that ↵US, Pacific > 0 and ↵EU, Venezuela South > 0. However, for the municipalities tra cking through the
Atlantic border and the North Venezuelan border the e↵ect of the prices in the US and Europe is not clear because the could
be serving both markets.
3.2 Instrumental variables for a discrete duration estimation
Following the discussion above, I assume that DDmt ? "ijmt, therefore DDmt ? h0 (j). In order to estimate  , I write the
proportional hazard model of equation 7 as a linear indicator function:13
pregijmt = 1 [h0 (j) +  homijmt +Xi + T +M + "ijmt > 0] (9)
If  is the cdf of the error term  "ijmt, I rewrite the latest equation as:
pregijmt =  (h0 (j) +  homijmt +Xi + T +M) (10)
As I discussed previously, hommt 6? "ijmt so hommt 6? h0 (j). If I define homijmt as:
homijmt = DDmt + h0 (j) +Xi + T +M + µijmt (11)
Following Blundell and Powell (2004), " and µ have joint probability distribution such that "ijmt = ⇡ (µijmt) + !ijmt, where
! has a cdf defined by the function ⇤. Replacing " in equation 9 using ⇤ I rewrite the equation of first pregnancy as:
pregijmt = ⇤ (h0 (j) +  homijmt + ⇡ (µijmt) +Xi + T +M) (12)
Identification relies on the distributional assumption on ⇧ which will determine the distribution of !. For example, assuming
joint normality I can rewrite " as a linear function of µ and ⇤ would be a normal function. 14 For this reason, I estimate
the discrete duration model (equation 12) using di↵erent functional forms for ⇡ (µ) and !.
13T and M represent the year fixed e↵ects and municipality fixed e↵ects
14For instance, Lillard (1993) assumes joint normality between the probability of dissolve marriage and pregnancy inside marriage. This allows
him to estimate the parameters of the function ⇧. Furthermore, Blundell and Powell (2004) assume also normality to estimate the income e↵ect
on labor market participation.
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4 The Data
For the estimations of this paper I use three different types of data. First, individual data about women pregnancy outcomes
from the Colombian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from 2000 to 2010. The data includes 3 cross section cohorts
(2000, 2005 and 2010) of women from 13 to 49 years old from 358 municipalities in Colombia.15 Table 11 in B summarises the
main individuals characteristics of the sample of analysis. The sample adds up to 106405 women where 23% are adolescents
(from 13 to 19 years old).
In this section I focus the analysis on the second panel of table 11 which contains the main statistics of the core outcome
variables in my estimations. Accordingly, the average age of first intercourse, subject to having had intercourse, is 18 years
old. First pregnancies occur on average around 19 years old and first marriage around 20. Nevertheless, to have a better
view of the outcome variables I use figure 3. Panel a shows the failure function and panel b shows the hazard function of
first intercourse, pregnancy and marriage following Jenkins (2005). According to panel a, at the age of 19 almost 80% of
our sample have already had their first intercourse while 40% and 35% have already been pregnant or married for the first
time. Panel b shows that the peak for the hazard of first intercourse is at 18 years old. However, the hazard functions for
pregnancy and marriage almost constant from the age of 19 onwards.
(a) Cumulative failure function - F (j) (b) Hazard function - h (j)
Notes: The estimation does not include individuals who migrate town at some point after turning 13 years old.
Figure 3: Estimated discrete failure and hazard functions for first intercourse, pregnancy and marriage.
The second data set for the analysis is the information of homicides at the municipality level in Colombia. I use a panel
of yearly homicides from 1990 to 2009 using information for the National Vital Statistics from DANE.16 Figure 4 show the
evolution of the total homicide rate for the entire country and the municipalities in the DHS sample. Both series only show
some differences until 1997. Both series reach the maximum in 1992 and have a decreasing tendency until 1997. Then
homicides increased again until 2002. After 2002, rates dropped until 2008.
Figure 4: Annual homicide rate. Total vs DHS sample
Table 2 summarises different features of the homicide rate for 343 municipalities of the DHS sample. It is important to point
out that the Colombian average homicide rate is considerably larger than in developed countries like the United Kingdom
and United State where the current rates are 1 and 5 respectively. What is more, even after 2005 when the rates decrease,
the total value remains larger than the Mexican historical maximum rate of 23 homicides per 100 thousand habitants in
2011.
15The DHS data is available from 1995. However, some important variables of this analysis were not available before the 2000 survey. Colombia
has 1110 municipalities in total.
16Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad´ıstica is the Colombian national statistics bureau.
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Table 2:
Homicide rates by age and gender - Descriptive statistics for the municipalities in the DHS sample
Variable mean sd min max
Total homicide rate
Total 55.04 58.23 0 561
Less than 4 y.o. 2.01 10.87 0 407
5 to 14 y.o. 3.01 10.11 0 362
15 to 44 y.o. 96.49 107.23 0 1076
45 to 64 y.o. 59.32 79.14 0 1145
More than 65 y.o. 26.46 59.35 0 1015
Within municipality s.d. (Total)⇤ 31.92 26.62 0 157
Male homicide rate
Total 100.32 106.28 0 957
Less than 4 y.o. 2.02 13.24 0 352
5 to 14 y.o. 4.07 16.77 0 685
15 to 44 y.o. 178.01 198.05 0 2022
45 to 64 y.o. 107.47 141.38 0 1471
More than 65 y.o. 47.26 109.69 0 1887
Within municipality s.d. (Total) 58.74 48.14 0 281
Female homicide rate
Total 8.97 14.12 0 218
Less than 4 y.o. 2.00 16.64 0 820
5 to 14 y.o. 1.91 9.69 0 249
15 to 44 y.o. 14.30 25.39 0 353
45 to 64 y.o. 9.72 33.03 0 758
More than 65 y.o. 5.80 33.37 0 712
Within municipality s.d. (Total) 9.56 8.03 0 64
Male homicide proportion⇤⇤
Total 0.92 0.13 0 1
Less than 4 y.o. 0.56 0.46 0 1
5 to 14 y.o. 0.68 0.41 0 1
15 to 44 y.o. 0.92 0.13 0 1
45 to 64 y.o. 0.92 0.18 0 1
More than 65 y.o. 0.87 0.28 0 1
Notes: Author calculations.
⇤ The within municipality s.d. is the average standard deviation of each municipality in the sample from 1990 to 2009.
⇤⇤ The male homicide proportion is Male homicides/Total homicides
There are three key features in table 2 that are important to mention. First, independent of gender the homicide rates are
considerably larger for people from 14 to 44 years old. The average rate at this age is 96.5. This is more than twice the rate
from 45 to 64 and 32 times the rate for children from 5 to 14 years old. These proportions are similar for both men and
women. Second, male homicides are on average 10 times more frequent than women homicide. Men’s rate is 100 homicides
while women’s rate is 8.97. Furthermore, male homicides represent 92% of the total homicides. Third, large variations exists
between di↵erent municipalities. The average within municipality standard deviation is 31.9 with a range from 0 to 157.
This last fact shows that homicides’ dynamics vary across regions.
The last data set used for this paper is the information about cocaine tra cking in Colombia from Milla´n-Quijano (2015).
On the one hand, geographical variation in the instrument comes from the division of the total tra cking network according
to the border each municipality is linked with. Figure 5 shows the municipalities that belong to each tra cking cluster. In
black the municipalities that are also part of the DHS sample.
On the other hand, time variation is due to changes in the prices of cocaine in di↵erent international markets. Figure 6 shows
the evolution of cocaine wholesale prices in the United States, Europe and Colombia.17 Despite some common features in
the trend of the three prices, there are some di↵erences in the price evolution between the two main consuming regions.
Therefore, the interaction between each international price and each cocaine tra cking cluster allows me to estimate di↵erent
exogenous shocks in the level of homicides on di↵erent municipalities.
The descriptive statistics of the municipality level control variables are in the table 12 in B.
17The price of Europe is a weighted average of the prices in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
10
(a) Pacific (b) Atlantic (c) Venezuela North (d) Venezuela South (e) Outside the traffick-
ing network
Legend:
In the cluster and DHS sample.
In the cluster but not in the DHS sample.
Notes: Based on Milla´n-Quijano (2015). The trafficking routes have a maximum length of 1020 km
Figure 5: Municipalities in each cocaine trafficking cluster
Source: UNODC. All prices in 2009 USD corrected by purity.
Figure 6: Wholesale international prices of cocaine - USD per gram
4.1 Data preparation and restrictions
I transform the data to the shape of a survival panel following Jenkins (2005). Using the information of age, municipality of
residence and age at first pregnancy I declare for a woman i living in municipality m at year t:
pregijmt =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if never been pregnant at age j
1 if pregnant for the first time at age j
. if has already been pregnant before age j
(13)
I constraint the sample for women of 13 years old and older. It is important to point out that the observations of a given
individual are right censored if she has never been pregnant at the time of the interview. In addition, left censoring occurs
when a woman turned 13 before 1990 and was not pregnant the first year we observe her. I control for both censoring cases
in all estimations.
Afterwards, using the municipality of residence m and year t to merge the data a municipality level, specially the homicide
rate hommt. This use of the data has two major problems.
First, if a woman changed municipality of residence at some point over the period of analysis I am not able to link her
personal data with the data of the armed violence she faced in the origin municipality. For that reason, for the analysis of
pregnancy between age j and j¯ I exclude women that migrated at some point between the range of the estimations. Migration
implies different sources of bias that I am not able to control for. On the one hand, to migrate is a strategy households could
use to escape violent conflict. Thus, women who do not migrate may have different preferences for motherhood given that
moving or motherhood may be two substitute strategies against conflict. In this case, my estimates will be upper biased.
On the other hand, pregnancy may have been the reason that triggered the migration decision. Therefore, migration and
pregnancy are complementary strategies and my estimate will be lower biased. The effect of migration is without doubt a
very interesting and challenging problem for future research.
Second, for each individual I only have information at one period in time. Therefore, I cannot control for changes in some
variables that may be affecting the pregnancy decision. For this reason, in the set of individual controls I only include variables
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that do not change in time. I leave the ones that are time variant in the error term. It is important for identification that
these variables will not be correlated with my instrument. These variables could be for example education and labor market
participation. The time variation of these two variables is not correlated with the time variation of cocaine prices which rules
the time variation of the instrumental variable in this paper.
5 Results
For the estimations of the impact of homicides on the hazard of early pregnancy, I assume that  and ⇤ have a logistic shape
and h0 (j) = Ln (j).18 Therefore, I can estimate equation 10 using a logit function on pregijmt as defined in equation 13.
I also always use standardised homicide rates in the estimations. Table 3 summarises the resulting estimates of a discrete
duration logistic model for di↵erent age spells.
Table 3:
Homicide rates on the hazard of first pregnancy. Discrete logistic duration model.
Age range
13-19 13-17 15-19 20-24 25-29
Homicides 0.004⇤⇤ 0.000 0.005⇤⇤ 0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
h0(j) 0.066⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 -0.004⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant -0.201⇤⇤ -0.043 -0.037 -0.378⇤ 1.526⇤⇤⇤
(0.096) (0.113) (0.177) (0.198) (0.433)
R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. Also include year, birth cohort, household income quartile
and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Table 3 shows a significant and positive correlation between the homicide rate and the hazard of becoming pregnant for
teenagers (13 to 19 or 15 to 19). The e↵ect of homicides reduces for older groups. These results are like the ones shown in
figure 2. Moreover, table 3 and figure 2 show that the e↵ect of homicides is small and not statistically significant for the
younger women of the sample (13-17). Therefore, from now on I estimate the duration model using groups of 5 years starting
at age 15.
This is not a causal e↵ect as the orthogonality condition - homijmt?"ijmt | j and h (j)?"ijmt does not hold for the reasons
previously discussed in section 3. Thus, I follow the two stage estimation following equations 11 and 12. Accordingly, table
4 shows the results for the estimation of equation 11 over the sample of DHS municipalities and individuals of di↵erent age
groups.19
Table 4:
First stage estimations. Cocaine tra cking on Homicide rates.
Age range
P◆ Df 13-19 15-19 20-24 25-29
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US Pacific 1.523⇤⇤⇤ 1.532⇤⇤⇤ 1.469⇤⇤⇤ 1.395⇤⇤⇤
(0.360) (0.378) (0.325) (0.271)
Atlantic 1.313⇤⇤⇤ 1.325⇤⇤⇤ 1.520⇤⇤⇤ 1.321⇤⇤⇤
(0.316) (0.320) (0.285) (0.271)
Ven. North 0.039 0.078 0.157 0.467
(0.358) (0.371) (0.373) (0.435)
Ven. South 0.287 0.251 0.326 0.113
(0.383) (0.392) (0.399) (0.492)
Europe Pacific 0.393 0.376 0.357 0.251
(0.474) (0.455) (0.422) (0.340)
Atlantic 0.761⇤⇤ 0.792⇤⇤ 0.635⇤⇤ 1.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.306) (0.321) (0.278) (0.270)
Ven. North -0.592 -0.613 -0.454 -0.670
(0.395) (0.396) (0.424) (0.396)
Ven. South 0.679⇤ 0.724⇤⇤ 0.495 0.618⇤
(0.356) (0.351) (0.327) (0.334)
F Test 23.58 24.58 13.04 7.59
R2 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.78
Notes: Idem
The zones of Colombia that seem to be connected with the American market are the Pacific and the Atlantic. Meanwhile,
the southern part of the Colombian border with Venezuela and the Atlantic coast are the regions linked with the European
18The results using di↵erent specifications for  and ⇤ are in A.
19Due to sample composition, some results in this paper di↵er marginally from the main results of Milla´n-Quijano (2015). However, the main
relationships hold. What is more, the results are homogeneous among age groups.
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market. It is important to point out that the Atlantic coast is the region of Colombia which seems to be use to serve both
international markets. Finally, the joint significance test over DDmt is larger than 10 in almost all estimations. The statistic
falls below 10 in the estimations for women from 25 to 29 years old because the sample size reduces. In this last case the
sample only includes women that have not been pregnant before turning 25 years old. According to figure 3 less than 40%
of the sample remains without pregnancy after the age of 25.
Table 5:
Second stage estimations. Homicide rates on the hazard of first pregnancy. Instrumented with cocaine tra cking.
Age range
13-19 15-19 20-24 25-29
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicides 0.090⇤⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤ 0.097 0.027
(0.033) (0.036) (0.061) (0.099)
h0(j) 1.804⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.031 -0.037⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.018)
Constant -10.470⇤⇤⇤ -7.617⇤⇤⇤ -5.773⇤⇤⇤ 9.009⇤⇤
(1.695) (1.802) (2.059) (3.854)
 F
⇣
j, j¯
⌘†
2.55⇤⇤⇤ 2.15⇤⇤ 3.00 0.80
[0.94] [1.01] [1.90] [2.99]
Joint significance ‡
Instrument:
DDmt
23.58 24.58 13.04 7.59
Control function:
⇡ (µ)
12.49 28.92 23.04 60.28
R2 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.04
Individuals 40405 36162 19403 9324
N 182543 122853 60547 29485
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. The estimations also include year, birth cohort, household
income quartile and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
† Standard errors computed using the Delta method in square brackets [ ].
‡ Joint significance F Test. The instrument is DDmt as defined in equation 8. The control function is ⇡ (µ) =
P3
n=1 ⌘nµ
n.
At last, table 5 shows the second stage results of the impact of homicides on the hazard of first pregnancies. The table
shows the resulting estimates over di↵erent age groups. One standard deviation increases the hazard of being pregnant in
the teenage years by 0.09. It is important to recall that the logistic functional form in a discrete duration model identifies
the proportional odd ratio. Then, for a given age j and a vector of observables X I can define the odds as function of
homicides as ⇢ (hom| j, X) = h(j, hom,X)/1 h(j, hom,X). Then, for two di↵erent values of the homicide rate (hom1, hom2),
⇢(hom1| j,X)/⇢(hom2| j,X) = e
 ˆ(hom1 hom2). Given that in the estimation the homicide rate is standardised, the e↵ect of one
standard deviation of the homicide rate on the odd ratio of being pregnant at certain age is e ˆ .
Using the shape of h, and to make the understanding of the results easier, I construct the cumulative probability of getting
pregnant in the age range of analysis. Then the cumulative failure function F
 
j, j¯, hom
 
= 1 Qj¯x=j h (x, hom). The lower
panel of table 5 reports  F
 
j, j¯
 
= F
 
j, j¯ | hom = 1    F  j, j¯ | hom = 0 . Then,  F  j, j¯  represents the e↵ect in
percentage points (pp) of one standard deviation increase in the homicides on the probability of being pregnant in certain
age range.
Hence, one standard deviation increase in the homicide rate increases by 2.55 pp the probability of being pregnant between
13 to 19 years old. Column 2 in table 5 shows that the e↵ect is 2.15 for women from 15 to 19. The e↵ect of homicides on
the cumulative probability of pregnancy remain positive for older cohorts, however, this e↵ect is only statistically significant
for teenage women.
5.1 Exploring possible mechanisms
According to the discussion in section 2.3 this paper claims that armed violence changes the expectations of young women in
the labor and marriage markets. Unfortunately I do not have information about women’s expected returns in these markets.
However, I use alternative estimations to give information about possible mechanisms.
Table 6 shows the estimation of the impact of homicides on the hazard of di↵erent correlated outcomes such as first pregnancy,
first intercourse, first marriage and second pregnancy. As a reference point, column 1 shows the e↵ect on the hazard of first
pregnancy (the same as of column 2 in table 5). According to column 2, an increase in the homicide rate reduces the hazard
of early intercourse by 5.9 pp. This may be due to a shortage of available men. In addition, this finding may reinforce the
idea that teenage pregnancy is a rational rather than irrational decision when women experience more armed violence in
their town of residence.
In column 3, I explore the e↵ect of homicides on the hazard of early marriage. Thus, one standard deviation increase in the
homicide rate increases by 2.53 pp the probability marriage before 19 years old. Interestingly, teenage marriage and pregnancy
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Table 6:
Second stage estimations. Homicide rates on the hazard of di↵erent events for women from 15 to 19 years old. Instrumented with cocaine
tra cking.
Hazard:
First Second First⇧
Pregnancy Intercourse Marriage pregnancy  Pregnancy Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Homicides 0.079⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤ -0.135 0.552⇤⇤⇤ 0.339⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.031) (0.033) (0.090) (0.116) (0.060)
h0(j) 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.589⇤⇤⇤ 0.743⇤⇤⇤ 0.288⇤⇤⇤ 0.262⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.059) (0.050) (0.037)
Constant -7.617⇤⇤⇤ -3.010 -12.631⇤⇤⇤ -18.189⇤⇤⇤ -2.489 -13.139⇤
(1.802) (2.794) (1.955) (4.665) (5.479) (7.247)
 F
⇣
j, j¯
⌘†
2.15⇤⇤ -5.90⇤⇤⇤ 2.52⇤⇤⇤ -4.12 2.39⇤⇤⇤ 6.39⇤⇤⇤
[1.01] [0.94] [0.81] [2.72] [0.18] [0.86]
Joint significance ‡
Instrument: DDmt 24.58 28.74 26.94 14.39 7.25 12.15
Control function: ⇡ (µ) 28.92 47.20 10.77 2.64 16.04 19.96
R2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.07
Individuals 36162 31392 36320 10010 7642 9162
N 122853 88037 126203 19617 12142 16930
Notes: Idem
  Conditional on being already a mother.
⇧ Conditional of being already pregnant/married for first marriage/pregnancy.
seem strongly correlated strategies in response to increases in the local armed violence. According to my hypothesis, women
may make a choice of early pregnancy and marriage to guarantee a certain level of utility in the marriage market when the
expectations in this market reduce. This strong correlation is also shown in figure 7. The figure shows that until the age
of 19, the probability of not being married when you are a mother, or not being a mother if you are married is not larger
than 10%. What is more, the likelihood of having children out of the wedlock is larger than the probability of being married
without any o↵spring.
Figure 7: Probability of not being a mother/married, conditional on being married/a mother
Then, columns 5 and 6 try to explore deeper the relationship between the timing of marriage and pregnancy. The result
suggest that one standard deviation rise in the homicide rate increases by 2.39 pp the probability of early pregnancy for
women who are already married, and by 6.39 pp the probability of early marriage for women who are already pregnant. In
these conditional cases, the e↵ect on marriage is significantly larger than the e↵ect on pregnancy. This suggests that the close
correlation of marriage and pregnancy is driven more for cases of teenage women getting married after becoming pregnant,
rather than teenage women marrying before pregnancy.
Column 4 studies the e↵ect of homicides on second pregnancy for women who already have had one baby. According to
section 2.3, a young woman will decide to be a mother if she foresees the possible losses in the marriage market are larger
than the cost of teenage motherhood on the future labor market. However, when a woman already has one baby there are
no extra gains in the marriage market. If I assume that the losses in the labor market are weakly concave with respect the
number of babies, then the cost in the future labor market of the second baby is not as large as the cost of the first o↵spring.
Therefore, increases in the homicide rate may not increase or decrease the hazard of second pregnancy. Column 4 shows that
one standard deviation decreases by 4.12 pp the probability of getting pregnant for the second time. However, this e↵ect is
not statistically significant.
Section 2.3 discusses the importance of changes in the sex ratios due to the e↵ect of the di↵erences between male and female
homicide rates. For that reason table 7 summarises the main results of the second stage estimations using the homicide rate
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Table 7:
Second stage estimations. Homicide rates by gender and age range on the hazard of first pregnancy for women from 15 to 19 years old. Instrumented
with cocaine tra cking.
Age range
All 5 to 14 15 to 44 45 to 64
Male
Homicides 0.079⇤⇤ 0.103⇤ 0.082⇤⇤ 0.122
(0.035) (0.054) (0.036) (0.113)
Instrument† 28.51 20.97 24.92 21.20
Control Function‡ 36.77 18.75 32.87 2.38
Female
Homicides 0.115 0.256 0.140⇤ -0.019
(0.071) (0.170) (0.073) (0.242)
Instrument† 5.36 5.49 6.56 4.79
Control Function‡ 15.23 4.79 29.92 19.88
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. The estimations also include year, birth cohort, household
income quartile and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
† Joint significance F Test on the instrument DDmt as defined in equation 8.
‡ Joint significance F test on the control function ⇡ (µ) =
P3
n=1 ⌘nµ
n.
by gender and age range. The table shows that male homicides from 4 to 15 and 15 to 44 have a positive, significant impact
on the hazard of first pregnancy between 15 to 19 years old. The e↵ect is not significant when the independent variable is the
homicide rate of males from 45 to 64. This show that the homicides related with the possible marriage market of teenagers
is the one that actually a↵ects the pregnancy decision.
Unfortunately, the table shows also that the instrument is not relevant for female homicides. For that reason, the results of
the impact of women homicides are biased. Therefore, I estimate the change in sex ratios from 1990 to 2009 due to homicides.
Then, for a municipality m and age range j:20
 SˆRmj =
SˆRmj2009
SRmj1990
  1
Where:
SˆRmj2009 =
malesmj1990  
P2009
t=1990male homicidesmjt
femalesmj1990  
P2009
t=1990 female homicidesmjt
SRmj1990 =
malesmj1990
femalesmj1990
.
Table 8:
Second stage estimations. Homicide rate on the hazard of first pregnancy for women from 15 to 19 years old. Using the interaction between the
homicide rate and the estimated change in the sex ratio by age. Instrumented with cocaine tra cking.
Age range - j
5 a 14 15 a 44 45 a 64
Homicides 0.084 0.107⇤⇤ 0.080⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.054) (0.036)
Homicides x Large change -0.005 -0.030 -0.064⇤
(0.027) (0.029) (0.033)
Large change• 2.109 0.775⇤ -0.425
(1.868) (0.462) (0.666)
pj(3) -0.25 % -9.19 % -6.27 %
Control Function 20.59 26.28 9.03
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. The estimations also include year, birth cohort, household
income quartile and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
• Large change is defined as 1
h
 SˆRmj  pj (3)
i
.
‡ Joint significance F test on the control function ⇡ (µ) =
P3
n=1 ⌘nµ
n.
In table 8 the e↵ect of the interaction between the total homicide rate and a dummy that is equal to 1 for the municipalities
where the estimated change in the sex ratio belongs to the third percentile of the distribution. Given that the changes are
20Figure 1 shows the relationship between SˆRmj2009 and SRmj1990 when j = 15 to 44.
15
negative in the majority of the cases, the municipalities in the third percentile are the ones where the di↵erence between male
and female homicides is larger. There are 3 important facts in this table. Firstly, the changes in the sex ratio are stronger
for adults than for children. The third percentile from 5 to 14 is only -0.25% while the value is -9.19% from 15 to 44 and
-6.27%. Secondly, in municipalities where the change in the sex ratio from 15 to 44 is large, teenage women have 0.77 higher
hazard of being pregnant before 19. However, the e↵ect of homicides on their pregnancy decision is not significantly di↵erent
from municipalities with lower changes in the sex ratio. Thirdly, the e↵ect of homicides on the hazard of first pregnancy is
0.064 points smaller in the municipalities where the sex ratio from 45 to 64 years old changed more.
The interpretation of the last set of results is the following: Firstly, given that homicides are more even in the youngest
population and they are still outside the marriage market the di↵erences between male and female homicides do not a↵ect
the pregnancy decisions of women from 15 to 19 years old. Secondly, the municipalities where the 15 to 44 years old sex
ratio changed the must in the last 20 years are the ones with the highest hazard of teenage pregnancy. This comes along
the model in section 2, where I claim that women who expect less available men in the adulthood have more incentives to
become young mothers.
Unfortunately, as can be seen in table 13 I do not find direct evidence of the e↵ect of homicides on the expectations in the
labor market on the pregnancy decisions.
6 Conclusions
This work contributes to the analysis of the economic consequences and cost of violent crime, armed conflict and war. I use
of international cocaine prices and internal cocaine tra cking network to identify the e↵ect of homicides at the municipality
level on the prevalence of teenage motherhood in Colombia.
A reduced form estimation shows that when the cocaine price in the Unites States increases, the homicide rate increases
in the municipalities part tra cking from the Colombian Pacific and Atlantic coast and Venezuela North . Meanwhile,
homicides rise in the municipalities involved in tra cking through the Atlantic coast and the southern Venezuelan border
when the price of cocaine increases in Europe.
My second stage results suggest that one standard deviation increase in the municipality homicide rate rises by 2.15 pp the
probability that a woman become pregnant between 15 to 19 years old. The e↵ect remains positive but not statistically
significant for women from 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 years old. When the homicide rate increases by one standard deviation I
also found that: (i) the probability of first marriage between 15 to 19 years old also rises by 2.52 pp. (ii) The probability of
having a second pregnancy conditional to already having one baby reduces by 4.12 pp, however the e↵ect is not statistically
significant. (iii) The e↵ect of homicides on the hazard of first marriage conditional on being pregnant is significantly higher
than the e↵ect of homicides on the hazard first pregnancy conditional on being married.
In addition I found that male homicides from 15 to 44 years old have a stronger e↵ect on the pregnancy decision. Municipalities
where the sex ratio from 15 to 44 years old fell more than 9.1% from 1990 to 2009 are the ones where young women are more
likely to get pregnant. However, the e↵ect of homicides is not statistically di↵erent by city size, wealth quantile or between
urban and rural areas.
The latest results suggest that homicides, and especially the inequality between male and female homicides, change the
expectations of young women in the marriage market more than in the labor market. Thus, when the homicide rate rises
young women have more incentives to become mothers and married to secure consumption in the marriage market when
they foresee a decrease in future utility due to the rise of armed violence.
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A Testing the functional form of the duration model
One of the main concerns in my identification strategy come from the functional form of the cdf ⇤ and the control function
⇡ (µ). For that reason in this appendix I allow these functions to have di↵erent functional forms in order to show that the
choice of the shape of ⇤ and ⇡ (µ) does not constraint the results.
First, recalling from section 3 the control function approach comes from the joint distributional assumptions of the error
terms (", µ). Hence, in my estimations so far I assume that the joint distribution is such that " =
P3
n=1 ⌘nµ
n + ! where !
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Table 9:
Second stage estimations using di↵erent polynomial forms for the Control Function - ⇡ (µ). Homicide rates on the hazard of first pregnancy for
women from 15 to 19 years old. Instrumented with cocaine tra cking.
Control function polynomial degree (j)
1 2 3 4 5
Homicides 0.086⇤⇤ 0.087⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤ 0.084⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
h0 (j) 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -7.819⇤⇤⇤ -7.791⇤⇤⇤ -7.617⇤⇤⇤ -7.631⇤⇤⇤ -7.772⇤⇤⇤
(1.776) (1.778) (1.802) (1.799) (1.779)
F Test‡ 1.13 2.43 28.92 31.61 58.85
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. The estimations also include year, birth cohort, household
income quartile and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
‡ Joint significance F test on the control function is ⇡ (µ) =
Pj
n=1 ⌘nµ
n.
has a logistic form. Now I allow " =
Pj
n=1 ⌘nµ
n + ! with j 2 {1, . . . , 5} to have a polynomial form of degree j in order to
approach to any nonlinear shape. However, I maintain the logistic distribution of !.
Table 9 show coe cients of main interest and the join significance test for the control function polynomial. The joint
significance F test rises from 2.43 to 28.92 when the polynomial degree increases from 2 to 3. This is evidence that ⇡ (µ) is
not a linear function as it is assumed in more standard instrumental variable models. Nevertheless, the coe cients on the
homicide rate do not vary with the polynomial form. Thus, the results exposed in section 5 are consistent independently
from the functional form of ⇡ (µ).
Second, I maintain the shape of ⇡ as the 3rd degree polynomial and change the assumptions on the distribution of !. If
(", µ) have a join normal distribution and  µ = 1, then µ = ⇢" + ! where ! ⇠ N (0, 1) - (Blundell and Powell (2004)).
Therefore, the latest will identify   using a lineal probability model or a probit model to estimate h. The problem of using
the probit and linear specification is that they do not have properties of the proportional hazard model. For that reason, I
estimate as well a clog-log regression which maintains the proportional hazard qualities but implies that ! has an extreme
value distribution function.
Table 10:
Second stage estimations using di↵erent functional forms for the duration function - ⇤. Homicide rates on the hazard of first pregnancy for women
from 15 to 19 years old. Instrumented with cocaine tra cking.
Logit Probit Clog-log Linear IV†
Homicides 0.079⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤ 0.073⇤⇤ 0.005⇤ 0.005⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.018) (0.034) (0.002) (0.002)
h0 (j) 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.427⇤⇤⇤ 0.797⇤⇤⇤ 0.0571⇤⇤⇤ 0.0571⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.016) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002)
F Test‡ 28.92 36.77 25.70 8.95
R2 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04
Notes: Idem
‡ Joint significance F test on the control function is ⇡ (µ) =
P3
n=1 ⌘nµ
n.
Table 10 shows the resulting estimates for the discrete duration model using di↵erent specifications of !. The table shows
that the main results remain constant over di↵erent estimations. The di↵erence between the coe cients is the result of the
functional form, while the size of the e↵ect may di↵er between linear and non-linear forms, the sense of the coe cients and
the interpretation does not change with respect to the logistic model use in the main specification of this paper.
B Support tables
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Table 11:
Individual characteristics - descriptive statistics
Variable Full sample Adolescents (13 to 19)
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Age 29.45 10.65 13 49 16.03 1.97 13 19
% 13 to 19 0.23 0.42 0 1
Sexual activity and marriage
Age at first intercourse 17.81 3.59 8 45 15.22 1.58 8 19
Age at first pregnancy⇤ 19.95 4.46 13 45 15.76 1.49 13 19
Age at first birth 20.75 4.50 13 46 16.30 1.43 13 19
Age at first marriage 20.37 4.88 13 47 15.75 1.60 13 19
Migration (%)
Ever migrate 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Migrate after 13 y.o. 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Migrate after 15 y.o. 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Migrate after 20 y.o. 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Migrate after 25 y.o. 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Birth cohort
before 1985 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
1985 to 1989 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.27 0.44 0 1
1990 to 1994 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
after 1995 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Household characteristics
% in urban areas 0.78 0.41 0 1 0.75 0.43 0 1
# of household members 5.02 2.26 1 21 5.47 2.34 1 21
Ethnicity
White 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
Indigenous 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1
Afro-colombian 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1
Other minority 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Parents mortality - Household % where the father/mother is dead
Mother is dead 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.02 0.16 0 1
Father is dead 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Both parents are dead 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.01 0.07 0 1
Notes: Author calculations using DHS 2000 - 2010. Mean and standard deviation estimations using probability weights. N = 106405 women from
13 to 49 y.o.
⇤ Include also pregnancy events that ended up with miscarriage.
Table 12:
Municipality level control variables - Descriptive statistics
Variable mean sd min max
Municipality with coca bushes (%) 0.28 0.45 0 1
Municipality at the border (%) 0.10 0.30 0 1
Population (Ln) 10.30 1.16 8 16
Male population (%) 0.50 0.02 0 1
Urban population (%) 0.49 0.26 0 1
Roads (km) 495.41 817.84 0 8988
Primary roads (km) 38.32 50.82 0 623
Primary roads (%) 0.13 0.14 0 1
Area (km2) 1550.04 4867.64 18 65557
Road density (1/km) 0.80 0.45 0 2
Population density (habitants per km2) 278.01 978.78 0 13929
Oil e↵ect⇤ 0.26 3.68 0 150
Co↵ee e↵ect⇤ 91.84 195.77 0 1476
Uribe’s government† 0.40 0.49 0 1
Chavez’s government† 0.55 0.50 0 1
Municipality with Familias en Accio´n (%)‡ 0.20 0.40 0 1
Departmental GDP per capita  4472.15 3598.12 311 28966
Notes:
⇤ Based on Dube and Vargas (2013).
† Dummy equal to 1 when A´lvaro Uribe Velez/Hugo Cha´vez Fr´ıas was the president of Colombia/Venezuela
‡ Municipalities with the CCT program Familias en Accio´n.
  Million pesos (COP) per year.
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Table 13:
Second stage estimations. Homicide rate on the hazard of first pregnancy for women from 15 to 19 years old. Using the interaction between the
homicide rate and some variables. Instrumented with cocaine tra cking.
(1) (2) (3)
Homicides 0.047 0.090⇤⇤ 0.072⇤
(0.048) (0.036) (0.037)
Homicides x Urban 0.034
(0.027)
Urban 0.065
(0.046)
Homicides x Poor -0.036
(0.031)
Homicides x Medium income -0.019
(0.023)
Poor  1.473⇤⇤⇤
(0.047)
Medium income  1.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.032)
Homicides x Small city 0.032
(0.032)
Homicides x Medium city 0.030
(0.063)
Small city† -2.905⇤
(1.663)
Medium city† -2.708⇤
(1.605)
h0 (j) 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 0.847⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -7.433⇤⇤⇤ -7.303⇤⇤⇤ -4.667⇤⇤⇤
(1.852 (1.893) (1.549)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07
Individuals 35792 35781 35787
Notes: All the estimations control for all the variables described in tables 11 and 12. The estimations also include year, birth cohort, household
income quartile and municipality fixed e↵ects. Standard errors clustered by Department in parentheses - 33 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
  Poor = households in the 2 lowest income quartiles. Medium = households in the 3 income quartile.
† Small city = Less than 100 thousand inhabitants. Medium city = Between 100 thousand to 1 million inhabitants.
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